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DIRECT APPEALS FROM BANKRUPTCY COURTS
TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS: THE EXPERIENCE
AFTER TWO YEARS
David George*

I. INTRODUCTION

Until recently, there was no way to appeal a bankruptcy
case directly from a bankruptcy court to a court of appeals.
Instead, the case had to be first appealed to the district court[ or
bankruptcy appellate panel.2 Only after that court or BAP had
ruled could the case be heard in the court of appeals. 3 That
changed in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), 4 which provides in some
circumstances for direct review of bankruptcy court orders by
the courts of appeals. 5
* David George is an appellate lawyer at Connelly Baker Wotring Jackson LLP in
Houston, Texas. He is board certified in civil appellate law by the Texas Board of Legal
Specialization. He is a former law clerk to Judge Harold R. DeMoss, Jr., of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Judge Joe J. Fisher of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Beaumont. He graduated with honors
from Baylor Law School and received his Bachelor of Arts from Baylor University.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (providing that district courts have jurisdiction to hear
bankruptcy appeals) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (providing for the establishment of Bankruptcy Appellate
Panels) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). In the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, bankruptcy appeals can go to BAPs instead of district courts. 6 Collier
Bankruptcy Practice Guide 117.02[2] n. 24 (Asa S. Herzog & Lawrence P. King eds.,
Matthew Bender 2007). BAPs consist of bankruptcy judges from the bankruptcy court's
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). Because the majority of circuits handling bankruptcy
appeals do not have BAPs, and because under the new direct appeal statute BAPs are
treated the same as district courts handling bankruptcy appeals, this article will refer to
district courts instead of to both district courts and BAPs.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
4. Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
5. BAPCPA § 1233, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2).
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For years, many in the bankruptcy community sought direct
appeals from bankruptcy courts to courts of appeals. 6 Direct
appeal proponents argued that the system of appeals by right
from the bankruptcy court to the district court and then to the
relevant court of appeals was inefficient for two reasons.7 First,
district court decisions are not binding precedent, so there is
increased uncertainty regarding the state of bankruptcy law.
Second, the two appeals by right add delay and expense to the
bankruptcy system.
Instead of abolishing district court review, BAPCPA,
which was passed in 2005, added direct review of bankruptcy
court orders by the courts of appeals, allowing a bankruptcy

court (or a district court handling a bankruptcy appeal) to certify
an appeal directly to the court of appeals. 8 The appeals court can

6. See e.g. Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to
Professor Chemerinsky, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 137, 141-47 (1997) (supporting a system of
direct appeals); National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty
Years 719 (Oct. 20, 1997) (providing, in section 3.1.3, that "[t]he current system which
provides two appeals ... should be changed to eliminate the first layer of review"); Ltr.
from Edith H. Jones, J., U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 5th Cir., to Byron R. White, J., U.S. S.
Ct. (ret.) & Chair, Commn. on Structural Alts. for the Fed. Cts. of App., Bankruptcy
Appeals
and
Fifth
Circuit
(Nov.
6,
1998),
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/report/comments
(noting that the
National
Bankruptcy Review Commission's recommendation of direct appeals was "strongly
supported by every group in the bankruptcy community," including "judges, lawyers,
academics, [and] creditor and consumer groups")[hereinafter Jones Letter]; Ltr. from M.O.
Sigal, Jr., Chair, Bus. Bankr. Comm., ABA Bus. L. Sec., to Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen., et al.,
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (H.R. 333)-Direct Appeals Issue (July 24, 2001)
(indicating that ABA "strongly" supported direct appeals), http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/letters/107th/bankruptcy072401 .html.
7. See e.g. FairchildAircraft, Inc. v. Campbell (In re FairchildAircraft Corp.), 220
B.R. 909, 917, 918 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (recognizing that "[a] district court's ruling
on a bankruptcy appeal enjoys little more precedential weight than does the original
bankruptcy decision itself," and that appeals by right to district court and then to court of
appeals "serve[ ] no practical purpose, and may actually be a detriment to the efficient
administration of bankruptcy"); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still
Unresolved Issues ofBankruptcy Law: A Fence or An Ambulance, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 525,
528-32 (1995) (discussing lack of precedential value for decisions and "troublesome"
nature of two-appeal process); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative
Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals 28-39 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2000), http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/BankrApp.pdf/Sfile/BankrApp.pdf (noting lack of binding precedent
in bankruptcy law); Jones Letter, supra n. 6 (referring to "problems" that "involve the lack
of stare decisis in bankruptcy, which leads to confusing and chaotic interpretations of the
relevant law, and the high cost and delay imposed by multiple layers of bankruptcy
appeals").
8. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).
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then decide whether to accept the direct appeal. 9 Absent a
certification by the lower court and an acceptance by the court
of appeals, however, the appeal still goes through the traditional
two-tier process.
This article explains the direct appeal statute and considers
how it has been applied in the two years since it was passed.
II. THE DIRECT APPEAL STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO
BANKRUPTCIES FILED BEFORE OCTOBER 17, 2005.
BAPCPA was signed in April 2005, but most of its
provisions-including the direct appeal provision-do not apply
to bankruptcies filed before its October 17, 2005, effective
date.' 0 The Seventh Circuit has held that this provision is
jurisdictional.11 So, even if the parties agree that a pre-October
17, 2005, case is subject to the direct appeal statute, the court of
appeals cannot hear a direct appeal in that case.
Because bankruptcies can take years, not many
bankruptcies filed after the effective date have been appealed.
The number of cases involving the direct appeal statute is
therefore relatively small. As more cases filed after the effective
date are appealed, the direct appeal statute will likely be used
more often.
III. LOWER COURT CERTIFICATION OF DIRECT APPEALS
There are two ways for the lower court 12 to certify a direct
appeal. The lower court, acting on its own motion 13 or a party's

9. Id.
10. In re McKinney, 457 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2006); BAPCPA § 1501(a) ("Except
as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take
effect 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act."), now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101
note.
11. McKinney, 457 F.3d at 624-25.
12. Because direct appeals in bankruptcy matters can come from bankruptcy courts,
district courts, or BAPs, the legislative history uses the term "lower court" to refer to all
three of those courts. H.R. Rpt. 109-31(1) (April 8, 2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 206 [hereinafter House Report].
13. In one of the first direct appeal cases, the court sua sponte certified a direct appeal
of its order, but the parties never appealed the order. See In re Virissimo, 332 B.R. 208, 210
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2005) (certifying direct appeal); David Rosendorf, No Appeal on
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request, can certify that

"

The judgment or order involves a question of
law as to which there is no controlling authority
from the relevant court of appeals or the
Supreme Court;

*

The judgment or order involves a matter of
public importance;

*

The judgment or order involves a question of
law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions;
or

*

An immediate appeal from the judgment or order
14
may materially advance the case's progress.

In addition, if both a majority of the appellants and a majority of
the appellees request the lower court to certify a direct appeal,
and they represent that the above-listed standards are met, then
the lower court must certify the direct appeal.15
BAPCPA does not make clear whether the certification
request should be made in the bankruptcy court or the district
court. The interim bankruptcy rules, which most bankruptcy
courts have adopted,' 6 provide that while the case is pending in
the bankruptcy court, the certification request must be made in
the bankruptcy court.' 7 After an appeal has been docketed in the
district court, or the district court has allowed an interlocutory
the certification request must
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a),
8
court.
district
the
in
made
be
Homestead Cap? ABI's BAPCPA Blog (Am. Bankr. Inst.), http:/ibapcpa.blogspot.com
(Nov. 28, 2005, 3:07 p.m. EST) (noting that no appeal was filed in Virissimo).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). The statute says that if the requirements are met, the
lower court "shall" certify the appeal, so it appears that the lower court does not have
discretion to deny certification if the requirements are met. That is in keeping with the
legislative history, which states that if the requirements are met, the "certification must be
issued" by the lower court. House Report, supra n. 12, at 206.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B).
16. Berman v. Maney (In re Berman), 344 B.R. 612, 613 (9th Cir. BAP 2006).
17. Interim Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(0(2).
18. Id.
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A request for direct appeal certification must be made
within sixty days after the judgment or order is entered. 19 Direct
appeals do not stay the proceedings in the lower court unless the
lower court or the relevant court of appeals stays the
proceedings pending appeal.2°
IV. PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING CERTIFICATION
AND PETITIONING FOR DIRECT APPEAL

The direct appeal process is two-fold, and requires approval
from both the lower court and the court of appeals. If the lower
court certifies a direct appeal, then the parties file a notice of
appeal with the lower court 2 1 and a petition with the court of
appeals requesting permission to appeal. The appeals court
then must grant the petition before a direct appeal is allowed.23
BAPCPA provides temporary direct appeal procedures that
are in effect until the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are
amended.24 Under the temporary rules, a party must file the
petition requesting permission to appeal within ten days of the
lower court's certification.25 That could change under the
amended Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, so caution
should be used. Until the federal rules are amended, current
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5-which governs appeals
26
by permission in general-applies to BAPCPA direct appeals.
Both the certification request to the lower court and the
petition for direct appeal to the court of appeals should include
enough information to allow the court to determine whether to
allow the direct appeal. The request and petition must include
19. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(E).
20. Id. § 158(d)(2)(D).
21. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(a); Interim Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(f)(1).
22. BAPCPA § 1233(b)(4)(A) (setting out procedural rules).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (indicating that the appeal may proceed "if the court of
appeals authorizes the direct appeal").
24. BAPCPA § 1233(b)(1) (providing that the BAPCPA procedure is to apply "until a
rule of practice and procedure relating to such provision and such appeals is promulgated
or amended"). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to bankruptcy appeals at
the courts of appeals. Bankruptcy PracticeGuide, supra n. 2, at 117.02[3].
25. Id. at § 1233(b)(4)(A).
26. Id. at § 1233(b)(3).
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"

The facts necessary to understand the question
presented;

*

The question itself;

"

The relief sought;

"

Reasons showing why the direct appeal should
be allowed and that it is authorized by a statute
or rule; and

*

A copy of the27order complained of and any
related opinion.

The other parties can oppose the request or petition, or they
can file their own requests or petitions. These are due in the
lower court within ten days of the original request and in the
court of appeals within seven days of the original petition.28
V. THE STANDARDS FOR A COURT OF APPEALS
TO ACCEPT A DIRECT APPEAL

The direct appeal statute does not provide any standards for
the court of appeals to use when deciding whether to accept a
direct appeal, but the legislative history says that the appeals
courts "are encouraged to authorize direct appeals" when the
factors described above in Section III are met.29 So far, only two
circuits-the Second and the Seventh-have discussed the
standards that they will apply in deciding whether to accept
direct appeals. A summary of each approach follows.

27. Interim Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(f)(3)(C) (setting out requirements for certification
request); Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(1) (setting out requirements for direct appeal petition, which
include a copy of the lower court's direct appeal certification).
28. Interim Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(f)(3)(D)(relating to certification request); Fed. R.
App. P. 5(b)(2) (relating to direct appeal petition).
29. House Report, supra n. 12, at 206.
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A.

The Second Circuit'sApproach

In Weber v. United States Trustee,30 the Second Circuit
discussed at length when it would accept bankruptcy direct
appeals. The court noted that this was a question of first
impression among the circuits. 3' To provide "guidance," 32 the
court gave a detailed explanation of the policies behind the
bankruptcy direct appeal statute and outlined its standards for
accepting the appeals. The court admitted, however, that some
of its discussion was dicta and that each Second Circuit panel is
"free to authorize a direct appeal if they believe it would be
consonant with Congress's goals."3 3 While the Second Circuit's
opinion in Weber contains dicta and broad guidance, and is not
binding on the other circuits, its detailed discussion of when
bankruptcy direct appeals should be allowed will likely be
considered-if not followed-by other circuits. So, it is worth
examining the case in detail.
1. The Facts in Weber
In Weber, the question was whether a New York law that
raised the homestead exemption applied retroactively. 34 The
bankruptcy court held that the exemption was retroactive, and
granted leave for a direct appeal.3 5 The Second Circuit refused
to accept the direct appeal, saying that, even if all of the
statutory conditions for a direct appeal are met, it has "plenary
authority to grant or deny leave to file a direct appeal. 3 6
2. The Analysis in Weber
why

The Weber court looked to the statute's text, the reasons
Congress passed the statute, and "jurisprudential

30. 484 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2007).
31. Id. at 157 (acknowledging that "[tihe scope of § 1233, which authorizes direct
appeals under certain defined circumstances, is a matter of first impression").
32. Id.at 158 (recognizing that "[liegislative history confirms that Congress intended
§ 1233 to facilitate our provision of guidance on pure questions of law").
33. Id. at 161.
34. Id. at 157.
35. Id.
36. Id.at 161.
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considerations" to determine which standards to use when
deciding whether to accept the appeal.37
a. Analysis of the Text
Looking at the text, the court said that "[t]he focus of the
statute is explicit: on appeals that raise controlling questions of
law, concern matters of public importance, and arise under
circumstances where38 a prompt, determinative ruling might avoid
needless litigation."
b. Analysis of the Legislative History and the Rules
Looking to BAPCPA's legislative history, the Weber court
determined that Congress passed the direct appeal statute (1) to
allow courts of appeals to give guidance on "pure questions of
law" and (2) to allow appeals when the bankruptcy court's
39
judgment was "manifestly correct or manifestly erroneous."
The court then considered cases interpreting two other
provisions giving it discretionary jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). 4 The court
said that § 1292(b), like the bankruptcy direct appeal statute,
allows courts of appeals "to resolve controlling legal questions
expeditiousl," and "foster the development of coherent . . .
And the court noted that Rule 23(f) appeals are
precedent.'
useful to review orders that, although not final judgments,
"sound a66'death knell"' for the case. 42
37. Id. at 158.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Section 1292(b) gives the courts of appeals discretion to accept interlocutory
appeals if the district court certifies that the "order involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). Rule 23, which addresses class
actions, provides that a "court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(0
(available at http://uscode.house.gov).
41. Weber, 484 F.3d at 159.
42. Id. (citing In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Readers interested in the current state of the law in this area might consult Lori Irish

DIRECT APPEALS FROM BANKRUPTCY COURTS

c. Analysis of Jurisprudential Considerations
In examining jurisprudential considerations, the Weber
court said that, while "Congress emphasized the importance of
expeditious resolution in bankruptcy cases, it did not wish us to
privilege speed over other goals," because "speed is not
necessarily compatible" with its "ultimate objective" of
"answering questions wisely and well. '43 The court also noted
that that courts of appeals often benefit from letting issues
develop in the lower courts, and that "[p]ermitting direct appeal
too readily might impede
the development of a coherent body of
44
bankruptcy case-law."
3. The Conclusion in Weber
Taking all of the preceding considerations into account, the
Second Circuit established broad guidelines for when it will
accept direct appeals. It is "most likely" to accept a direct appeal
when (1) there is uncertainty in the bankruptcy courts (either due
to lack of controlling legal decisions or conflicting decisions) or
(2) the bankruptcy court's decision was "either manifestly
correct or manifestly incorrect," and the court of appeals would
be able to "render a decision expeditiously. ' '45 The court will be
"reluctant" to accept a direct appeal when "percolation through
the district court would cast more liht on the issue and facilitate
a wise and well-informed decision." 6
Applying these principles, the Second Circuit refused to
accept the direct appeal in Weber, noting that all three courts in
the circuit that had considered the issue had decided that the
exemption was retroactive.47 So, there was not a conflict that
created uncertainty in the bankruptcy courts. 48 The court also
said that the bankruptcy court's decision was neither manifestly
correct nor manifestly incorrect, so allowing a direct appeal
Bauman, Class Certificationand Interlocutory Review: Rule 23(0 in the Courts, 9 J. App.
Prac. & Process 205 (2007).
43. Weber, 484 F.3d at 160.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 161.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

228
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would not resolve the case more rapidly. 49 The Second Circuit
thus concluded that "prior consideration by the district court
would be beneficial and there is no compelling reason for this
court to address the issue in the first instance." 5
B. The Seventh Circuit'sApproach
The Seventh Circuit has not provided detailed guidance like
the Second Circuit, but it has at least indicated when bankruptcy
direct appeals will be accepted. In In re Wright,51 the Seventh
Circuit accepted a bankruptcy direct appeal that involved the
question of when a consumer's repayment plan could be
confirmed in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The court allowed the
direct appeal because the issue arose in "a large fraction of all
consumer bankruptcy proceedings," and had "divided the
bankruptcy courts. 52 The court noted that, even though a clear
answer to the question was needed, "this issue appears to be
'stuck' in the bankruptcy courts," with no courts of appeals and
only a few district courts addressing it. 53 The court said that, by
granting the direct appeal, "[l]ower litigation costs for thousands
of debtors and creditors may be achieved., 54 So, it appears that
the Seventh Circuit is likely to accept direct appeals when there
is little precedent in the courts of appeals and the issue affects
many other cases.
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECT APPEALS
IN BANKRUPTCY AND PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
UNDER

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

As discussed above, the Second Circuit looked to section
1292(b) cases when deciding whether to allow a bankruptcy
direct appeal. While there are many similarities between section
1292(b) and the bankruptcy direct appeal statute, the bankruptcy

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 161-62.
492 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id. at 831-32.
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statute is much broader. 55 For example,
"

Bankruptcy direct appeals are not limited to
cases where there is a disputed "controlling"
legal issue5 while permissive interlocutory
appeals are. 6

*

Bankruptcy direct appeals are allowed when
they may materially advance the case's
"progress," while a permissive interlocutory
appeal is not allowed unless the appeal may
materially advance the case's "ultimate
termination." 57
The bankruptcy direct appeal statute uses the
disjunctive "or" when referring to the appeal
materially advancing the case's progress, while
the permissive interlocutory appeal statute uses
the conjunctive "and" when referring to the
appeal materially advancing the case's ultimate
termination. 58 This means that under the
permissive-interlocutory-appeal statute, the court
must determine both (1) that there is a
substantial difference of opinion about a
controlling legal issue and (2) that resolving that
difference may materially advance the case's
ultimate termination. 59 Under the bankruptcy

55. For a discussion of the differences between the bankruptcy direct appeal statute and
the permissive-interlocutory-appeal statute in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see David Rosendorf,
Nevada Homestead Decision Certified for Direct Appeal, ABI's BAPCPA Blog (Am.
Bankr. Inst.), http://bapcpa.blogspot.com/ (Nov. 4, 2005, 4:58 p.m. EST).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see e.g. Marlbrough v. Crown Equip. Corp., 392 F.3d 135,
136 (5th Cir. 2004) (pointing out that "appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(b) extends only
to interlocutory orders that involve a 'controlling question of law').
57. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(iii) with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (available at http:
//uscode.house.gov).
58. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
59. Clark-Dietz & Associates-Engineers.Inc. v. Basic Const. Co., 702 F.2d 67, 69 (5th
Cir. 1983) (noting that Section 1292(b) appeals "are permitted only when there is a
substantial difference of opinion about a controlling question of law and the resolution of
that question will materially advance, not retard, ultimate termination of the litigation.").
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direct appeal statute, a direct appeal is allowed if
any one of the factors listed in the statute is met.
Thus, because the bankruptcy direct appeal statute is broader
than the permissive interlocutory appeal statute, counsel should
consider arguing that the direct appeal should be allowed even if
a permissive interlocutory appeal would be denied.
VII.CONCLUSION
Even after two years, it is too soon to tell how the new
direct appeal statute will play out. The picture will be clearer as
more cases fall under the new law. But, it appears already that
the direct appeal statute may make bankruptcy appeals more
efficient and less expensive, while at the same time clarifying
bankruptcy law by providing more precedent from the courts of
appeals.

